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CIVIL PRACTICE
Jay C. Carlisle?

During the 1992 Survey year, "new" legislation was enacted
which fundamentally changes the procedure for commencement of
some lawsuits.1 Effective December 31, 1992, all civil actions in
supreme and county courts must be commenced by filing a summons
and complaint or summons with notice.2 Several important amendments to the Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") were enacted3
and effective January 1, 1993, new IAS4 and escrow check bouncing5
rules became effective. Additionally, there have been significant developments in the decisional law of statute of limitation^,^ discovery,'
sanctions,$and the legal professiong. These and other areas should be
of interest to the bench and bar.

7 Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; Adjunct Professor of New
York Civil Practice, Fordham Law School and New York Law School; J.D., University
of California at Davis; A.B., University of California at Los Angeles; Member, New York
Bar.
This article is dedicated to Professor Hervey M. Johnson and to Jeffrey Brown, Esq.
Both died during the 1992Survey year. Professor Johnson was a founding member of the
Pace University School of Law faculty. He graduated from Princeton and was an editor
of the Duke Law Review prior to practicing law as an associate at the New York firm of
Davis, Polk & Wardwell. Hervey was a wonderful law teacher and our students consistently rated him as one of our best professors. His courses in Constitutional Law and
Contracts were favorites of thousands of Pace Law School students. Jeff Brown was an
outstanding law student at Pace Law School and an outstanding lawyer at the New York
City law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell. Jeff was the chief assistant to Robert Macrate
when he was president of the American Bar Association. The fact that Jeff died so soon
after his graduation from law school reminds us that life is fragile. The students, faculty,
deans and alumni of Pace Law School salute Hervey Johnson and Jeff Brown. We miss
them very much.
1. See infra notes 62-99 and accompanying text.
2. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 100-188 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 238-240 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 261-295 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 296-31 1 and accompanying text.
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I. NEW LEGISLATION
AND RULES
Space limitations prevent inclusion of an appendix summarizing
all CPLR legislation enacted during the Survey year. The reader
should review the table of contents for the various CPLR publications.10 The most important change is the adoption of a new filing
law for all civil actions in supreme and county courts.ll Prior to discussing these changes, the bench and bar should be alerted to the following statutory and rule changes.
A.

New IAS Rules Efective January 1, 1993

A series of changes in rules and operations of the Individual Assignment System ("IAS") became effective January 1, 1993.12 The
changes will provide judges with more case-management powers13
and encourage them to experiment with IAS rules.14 The new rules
require that preliminary conferences occur within forty-five days of
the filing of a request for judicial intervention, unless the parties complete and submit an agreed upon discovery schedule on a form order
prior to the conference.15 Also, unless the judge determines that circumstances require settlement or an order, decisions will be self-effectuating in nature.16 The rules and operational changes recommended
will be implemented in accordance with plans submitted by the administrative judges and approved for each judicial district in the

10. The complete text should be available for review in the 1992-93 publications by
Matthew Bender ("The Red Book"), Gould Publications ("The Black Book") or West's
McKinney Commentaries. Copies of the entire legislative texts may be obtained by contacting the Department of Governmental Relations. The practitioner should also consider subscribing to the Annual Legislative Bulletin of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York. The Bulletin analyzes the merits of the proposed bills and discusses
their impact on current laws. It is an excellent research tool and will keep the reader
abreast of current developments in Albany.
11. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
12. See N.Y. COMP.CODESR. & REGS.tit. 22, 5 208.8 (effective Jan. 1, 1993)
(amending 5 202.8 of the Uniform Civil Rules for the supreme and county courts, relating to motion procedure).
13. See Martin Fox, Rules Changesfor IASSystem Eflective Jan. I , N.Y. L.J., Dec.
14, 1992, at 1.
14. Id. at 2. (Chief Administrator of the Courts Matthew T. Crosson states the
changes "will increase the court system's ability to deal with the overwhelming number
of matters that come before it every day . . . [and] will also serve to strengthen the Individual Assignment System by making case processing procedures more uniform and
understandable."
15. N.Y. UNIFORMRULESOF THE COURT5 202.12(b) (McKinney 1993).
16. Id.
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state.17 Plans have been made for an IAS Committee "to monitor and
review the progress and effectiveness" of the new rules on a regular
basis and to issue its first monitoring report on or before May 1,
1993.18 Operational changes include informal motion practices such
as telephone conferences,lg the development of specialized commercia120 and matrimonial parts,21block conference scheduling,22 and refinement of existing methods of trial as~ignment.~3Copies of the
implementation plans for each judicial district should be obtained by
members of the bar.

B. New Escrow Check Bouncing Rules
During the Survey year important amendments to rules and regulations governing the maintenance of lawyer trust and escrow bank
accounts have been enacted.24 Among the changes, which are effective
January 1, 1993, are amendments to Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 9-102
of the Lawyers' Code of Professional Resp~nsibility.~s
The new rules
require that attorneys and law firms use only banks that have agreed
to report dishonored checks to attorney disciplinary committees.26
The rules are applicable to special, trust, escrow, and IOLA accounts.
The Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection will periodically publish a
list of participating banks. There will be three designations for client
-

-

-

17. Plans for the Ninth Judicial District and for the First Judicial District have
already been published and distributed to the bar. (Copies on file with the Syracuse Law
Review in the Barclay Law Library).
18. See Fox, supra note 13, at 2.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. ' m e use of specialized parts will increase, particularly with the establishment of four specialized commercial parts in New York County on Jan. 1, and the addition of more specialized parts exclusively for matrimonial cases."
22. Cases will be scheduled for conferences in blocks of time at intervals during the
day. This will decrease waiting time for lawyers and litigants and will replace the former
method of scheduling, where a large number of cases were scheduled to be heard at the
same time on a single day.
23. See Fox, supra note 13, at 2. "Based on a district-by-district review of current
caseloads, administrative judges, on an approved local option basis, will adopt or refine
existing methods of trial assignment, including dual-track (the assignment of back-up
judges for trial-ready cases if the IAS judge is unavailable) and the use of Trial Assignment Parts (in which all trial-ready cases are pooled and sent out to available judges for
trial).'.
24. See STATEBARNEWS, December 1992, at 12, col.1.
25. N.Y. DISCIPLINARY
RULESOF THE CODEOF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILI?Y
DR 9-102 (1993).
26. See STATEBARNEWS, supra note 24, at 12.
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and escrow accounts. Attorneys and law firms must choose one for
each account and have the title placed on their checks and deposit
slips. The titles are "Attorney Trust Account," "Attorney Special
Account," and "Attorney Escrow Account."
The new escrow rules provide for a dishonored check notice procedure.27 If a check written on one of the designated accounts
bounces for lack of funds, a notice will be sent by the bank to the
Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection. The Fund will hold the check
for ten days in case the notice was sent in error by the bank. Even if
the lawyer deposits money to cover the check, the notice won't be
withdrawn unless the bank was in error. Finally, after expiration of
the ten day period, the Fund will forward the notice to the appropriate disciplinary committee, based on the attorney or law firm's address. The Committee will then conduct an investigation and may
order an audit.28

C Attorney Fees Against the State
The New York State Equal Access to Justice Act was perma9 law creates a mechanently enacted during the Survey ~ e a r . ~The
nism authorizing the recovery of counsel fees and other reasonable
expenses in certain actions against the State of New York. It is similar to the provisions of federal law contained in 28 U.S.C. section
2412(d) and the significant body of case law that has evolved thereunder. Awards are limited to cases where the state cannot show that its
position is "substantially justified."30 Fees will be determined pursuant to prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services
furnished, except that fees and expenses may not be awarded to a
party for any portion of the litigation in which the party has unreasonably protracted the proceeding^.^^

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Act of March 31, 1992, ch. 36, 1992 McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y. 61
(codified at N.Y. STATEE ~ U A LACCESS TO JUSTICEACT 5 1, 2 (McKinney Supp.
1992)).
,,
30. Id. See also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) (fees under similar federal
statute could be awarded only if an agency had proceeded when there was no fair ground
for litigation).
3 1. See Act of March 31, 1992, supra note 29. See also Gary Spencer, Cuomo Signs
Bill Authorizing Awards of Fees Against State, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 27, 1989, at 1.

Heinonline - - 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 68 1993

Civil Practlce

19931

69

D. Recovery of Attorney Fees and Damages in SLAPP Suits
Effective January 1, 1993, a new section 70-a has been added to
the New York State Civil Rights Law.32 This authorizes claimants
who are subject to a SLAPP suit to claim costs, attorney fees, other
compensatory damages, and punitive damages. A claimant must fit
within the definitional section of section 76-a of the Civil Rights
La~.3~

E.

Civil Justice Expense and Reduction Plans

We again remind federal litigators that new civil justice expense
and reduction plans were enacted several weeks prior to the beginning
of the 1992 Survey year. On December 12, 1991, the Civil Justice
Expense and Delay Reduction Plan was adopted by the Board of
Judges of the Southern District of New York. On December 17,
1991, a similar plan was adopted by the Board of Judges of the Eastern District of New York. The plans were discussed in last year's
Survey of Civil Practice.34 Copies of the plans are available in the
appropriate federal court clerk's office and are "must reading" for
anyone contemplating litigation in the Eastern or Southern Districts.

I? Signz3cant CPLR Changes
During the Survey year there were thirty-six section or rule
changes to the CPLR. Some of the important changes are listed below. The practitioner is reminded to review the table of contents for
the various CPLR publications to note changes that may be relevant
to his areas of interest.35

I.

CPLR 213-b

CPLR 213-b was added to provide that a crime victim may commence a civil action for damages against a person convicted of a crime
within seven years of the date of the crime. This provision became
effective on July 24, 1992.36
32. See Act of August 3, 1992, ch. 767, 1992 McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y. 2103
(codified at N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS5 70-a (McKinney Supp. 1992)).
33. Id. (codified at N.Y. CIV.RIGHTS5 76-a (McKinney Supp. 1992)).
34. See Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1991 Survey of N. Y. Law, 43 SYRACUSE
L.
REV. 77, 96-101 (1992).
35. See supra note 10.
36. N.Y. CIV. PRAC.L. & R. 213-b (McKinney Supp. 1992).
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2. CPLR 214-~(1)
CPLR 214-c(1) was amended to broaden the definition of "exposure" to include exposure by implantation. The amendment became
effective on July 24, 1992, and is good news for plaintiffs who seek to
use New York's new discovery accrual statute of limitations in substance cases.37

3.

CPLR 307(2)

CPLR 307(2) was amended to add a provision authorizing personal service upon specified state agency officers by certified mail, return receipt requested. The provision became effective January 1,
1993, and requires that the envelope containing process bear the legend "URGENT LEGAL MAIL."38 Failure to strictly comply with
the statute may result in a dismissal in supreme and county courts.
Dismissal in the inferior courts will be for lack of jurisdiction and if
the statute of limitations has run, the action will be time-barred.39

4. CPLR 3405
CPLR 3405 was amended to provide that the rules promulgated
by the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the arbitration of certain claims may authorize use of judicial hearing officers as arbitrators. The rule became effective April 10, 1992.40

5. CPLR 3407
CPLR 3407 relates to preliminary conferences in personal injury
actions involving certain terminally ill parties. It was enacted by
chapter 582 of the Laws of 1992 and became effective September 1,
1992. Lawyers representing clients who are terminally ill and who
allege their illness is the result of the culpable conduct of another
party to the action "may request an expedited preliminary
~onference."~~

37. N.Y.CPLR 214-c(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
38. N.Y.CPLR 307(2) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
39. Id.
40. See Act of April 10, 1992, ch. 55, 1992 N.Y.Laws 55 (codified at N.Y.CPLR
340(s)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1992)).
41. See Act of July 24, 1992, ch. 582, 1992 McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y.1614
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 3407 (McKinney Supp. 1992)).
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6. CPLR 87
Effective April 10, 1992, Chapter 55 of the Laws of 1992 added
Article 87 to the CPLR.42 The provisions of the Article shall expire
and be deemed repealed on April 1, 1994.43 The new provision is
entitled "Punitive Damage Awards: Public Share." It provides that
in any civil action resulting in an award of punitive damages to a
private party, other than an award rendered against the state, upon
expiration of the time to appeal or the exhaustion of available appeals,
twenty percent of such punitive damages award shall be payable to
the state, and the judgment shall order payment a~cordingly.~~

G. The New Filing Law
During the Survey year a new mandatory filing law was enacted
for civil actions commenced in supreme and county courts after December 31, 1992.45The legislation includes changes in CPLR 203,
205, 207, 304, 305, 306-a, 306-b, 312-a, 1007, 1101, 1319, 6213, and
7102. It also provides for changes in the Uniform District Court
the New York Civil Court Act,47 the Uniform City Court
Act$* the Uniform Justice Court Act,49 the Domestic Relations
Law," the General Municipal Law,Sl the Navigation Law,52 the
Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation Law,53 and the Vehicle
Professor
and Traffic Law.54 Professor Siege1,ss Professor
42. See Act of April 8, 1992, ch. 55, 1992 McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y. 324
(codified at N.Y. CPLR 8701-8704 (McKinney Supp. 1992)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Act of June 23, 1992, ch. 216, 1992 McKinney's Sess. Laws of N.Y. 835 (codified at N.Y. CPLR 306-b (McKinney Supp. 1992)).
DIST. CT. ACT $401, et seq. (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992).
46. N.Y. UNIFORM
47. N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT $ 400 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1992).
48. N.Y. UNIFORM
CITYCT. ACT $5 400m, 409m, 411 (McKinney 1989 & Supp.
1992).
49. Id. $ 400 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992).
50. N.Y. DOM.REL.LAW5 21 1 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992).
51. N.Y. GEN. MUN.LAW$ 504-a (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1992).
52. N.Y. NAV. LAW$5 48, 74 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992).
53. N.Y. PARKSREC. & HIST. PRESERV.LAW $ 25.27 (McKinney 1984 & Supp.
1992).
54. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF.LAW$253 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1992).
55. See David D. Siegel, Imminent New Filing System Threatens Viability of Civil
Lawsuits, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Imminent New Filing]; David D.
Siegel, N.Y. ST. L. DIG., NOS.390, 391, 395 and 396. See also DAVIDD. SIEGEL,NEW
YORKPRACTICE
(2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1992).
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Barker,57 Professor Shapir~,~*
Professor Carpinello,59 and other@
have written on the new filing law. In addition Bert Bauman, Esq.,
and the New York State Trial Lawyers Institute have published a useEul "Quick Tip" dige~t.~l
Professor Farrell, who authored the Survey
of Civil Practice for ten years prior to the current author, has provided very helpful written comments regarding the legislative changes
in rules affecting commencement of actions in supreme and county
courts. The new rules are highlighted as follows:

I. In General
Prior to July 1, 1992, satisfaction of the statute of limitations was
inextricably linked to service of the summons and complaint or summons and notice upon the defendant.62 Failure to comply strictly
with New York service statutes would result in a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction and if the statute of limitations had run, the plaintiff did
not get the benefit of a six month extension under CPLR 205(a).63
Effective September 1, 1991, CPLR 306-a required that the summons
and proof of service be filed with the clerk of the court within thirty
days after service was complete.64 The statute applied to actions commenced in the supreme or county courts, including third party actions.65 It was designed to raise revenue, but many lawyers did not
comply with the statute and the legislature was forced to pass Chapter
216 of the Laws of 1992, which establishes mandatory filing require-

-

56. See Marc M. Arkin, New York's New Commencement By Filing Law, Special
Alert Available from Matthew Bender (an analysis of practice under Chapter 216 of the
Laws of 1992).
57. See Robert A. Barker, Provisions of The New Filing Law, N.Y. L.J., July 20,
1992, at 3.
58. See Fred L. Shapiro, Commencement by Filing Legislation, 19 WESTCHESTER
BAR J. 303 (Fall 1992).
59. See Carpinallo, The Commencement-by-Filing Law (written remarks before
New York State Trial Lawyers Institute) (copy on file in Barclay Law Library).
60. See James N. Blair and Paul H. Aloe, New Commencement by Filing Law: A
Practitioner's Survival Guide, N.Y. L.J., June 26, 1992, at 1.
61. See Bert Bauman, New Commencement By Filing Law, (written remarks before
New York State Trial Lawyers Institute) (copy on file in Barclay Law Library) and
NYSTLA QUICK TIP (written analysis of commencement of a special proceeding in
supreme and county courts of New York) (copy on file in Barclay Library).
L.
62. See Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey of A! I: Law, 41 SYRACUSE
REV.63, 89-94 (1990).
L.
63. See Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1988 Survey of N. I: Law, 40 SYRACUSE
REV. 77, 101-108 (1989).
64. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1991 Survey, supra note 34, at 78.
65. Id.
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The new
ments for all civil actions in supreme and county
legislation also seems to apply to actions filed in the surrogate's
but actions in other courts, including the court of claims,
must be commenced by service of process upon the defendant.68 The
new statutory scheme became effective July 1, 1992, and applies to
civil actions and proceedings commenced thereafter. There was a
transitional provision which permitted commencement of all civil actions by service of process on the defendant until December 31,
1992.69 If the filing fee required by CPLR 306-a was not paid by December 31, 1992, the "old style" action was deemed dismissed without prejudice. In this respect, the practitioner should note
Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. R o o ~ e v e l twhere
,~~
Justice Joan Lefkowitz authorized the late filing of a summons because the filing fee had been paid in 1992.71

2. Summary of Changes
(a) CPLR 203
The applicable statute of limitations stops running in supreme
and county court civil actions when the summons and complaint or
summons and notice is properly filed with the clerk of the court.72
The plaintiff, or his representative, must pay $170 for the index fee,
obtain a receipt, and be sure the summons indicates the index number
assigned and the date of filing. If "circumstances prevent filing," e.g.,
the clerk's office is closed, new CPLR 203(c)(2) provides that signing
of a judge's order will mark commencement of the action if the order
is filed within five days.73 REMEMBER, under the new filing law,

66. See Imminent New Filing, supra note 55, at 1.
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. 154 Misc. 26 336, 593 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sup. Ct. Rockland Co. 1993).
71. Id. at 336, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 923 (Plaintiff started an action on August 14, 1992,
and defendant defaulted. Plaintiff wanted to enter a default judgment but had failed to
file the summons and proof of service. Plaintiff had purchased an index number in 1992
and moved for a nunc pro tunc order of filing. The Supreme Court pointed out that prior
to December 31, 1992, one could commence an action without filing of summons and
complaint or summons and notice with the Supreme Court. The issue was whether plaintiff's application was subject to the new law. Justice Lefkowitz authorized the late filing
because the fee was paid in 1992, which met the implicit effective date requirements.).
72. See N.Y. CPLR 306-a (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
73. See N.Y. CPLR. 203(c)(2) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
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CPLR 203(b)(5)74 no longer governs supreme and county court actions but it is applicable in other courts.75

(b) CPLR 205
CPLR 205 codifies the applicable case law. There is no six
month extension if a civil action fded in supreme or county court is
dismissed for failure to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant.76 However, CPLR 306-b(b) allows the plaintiff to commence a second action
within 120 days after an automatic dismissal for failure to fde "proof
of service" or within 120 days after a jurisdictional dismissal.77
(c) CPLR 304

An action in the supreme or county court is commenced by the
filing of a summons and complaint or summons with notice with the
clerk of the
A special proceeding is commenced by filing of a
notice of petition or order to show cause with the clerk together with
the $170 index fee.79 As noted under CPLR 203, a court order may
establish the commencement date if circumstances prevent filing.80

(d) CPLR 305
The summons must indicate the index number assigned and the
date of filing. The third-party summons must also indicate the date of
filing. If the summons is served without the index number and date of
filing, it may be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.81

(e) CPLR 306-a; CPLR 1007 (third party actions)
Third party actions require filing the summons and complaint or
summons with notice and paying the $170 fee under CPLR 8018.82 A

74. See id. 203(b)(5) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
75. Id.
76. See sources cited supra note 55.
77. See N.Y. CPLR 306-b@) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
78. See id. 306(a) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
79. See sources cited supra note 55.
80. See N.Y. CPLR 203(c)(2) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
81. It is possible the court will consider a summons served without the index
number and date of filing on it a mere "irregularity" that can be cured, but why take the
chance?
82. See N.Y. CPLR 1007 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1992).
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third party action requires payment of an additional fee but no new
index number will be assigned.83

Cf) CPLR 306-b
Within 120 days from the date plaintiff files the summons and
complaint or summons and notice, he must also file proof of service.84
If the plaintiff fails to do so, the complaint is automatically dismissed
without prejudice and without c0sts.8~ The defendant cannot waive
the filing requirement.86 If the statute of limitations is four months or
less, i.e., Article 78 proceedings, proof of service must be filed not
later than fifteen days after the statute of limitations expires.87
If the action was timely commenced but dismissed "for failure to
effect proper service," i.e., failure to file proof of service within the
first 120 days, or failure to make proper service pursuant to the strict
compliance requirements in New York, plaintiff may refile and receive
another 120 days to complete the service. If service is not made during the first 120 days, the original action is deemed dismissed and the
second 120 days starts immediately upon the date the action is automatically dismissed.88 If service was attempted but "improper" for
failure to comply with New York's strict compliance requirements,
the second 120 days starts from the dismissal "despite the expiration
of the statute of limitations after commencement of the original
action."s9
Thus, if a tort action with a three year statute of limitations accrued on April 1, 1990, and the plaints files a summons and complaint or summons and notice on March 30, 1993, the action is timely.
However, plaintiff must properly serve defendant and file proof of service within 120 days from March 30, 1993. Assume plaintiff purports
to serve defendant on May 1, 1993, and files proof of service on that
date. Defendant answers on June 1, 1993, and raises the affirmative
defense of improper service. Plaintiff does not move to strike the defense and the court decides service was improper (no jurisdiction) on

83. Id.
84. See
85. Id.
86. See
87. See
88. See
89. Id.

N.Y. CPLR 306-b (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
sources cited supra note 55.
N.Y. CPLR 306-b@) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
id. 306-b (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
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June 1, 1996! Plaintiff has 120 days from that date to commence a
new action, properly serve the defendant and file proof of service.

3. Procedural Steps
First:

Second:
Third:

Fourth:

Prepare the summons with notice or summons and
complaint as you would ordinarily, except the
summons should provide for entering the index
number and the date of filing.
Go to the Clerk's office with copies of the papers
prepared in step one.
File the papers. When filing with the $170 fee for
the index number be sure to ask the clerk for a
receipt and a copy of the papers date-stamped. If
the clerk advises that he will stamp and file the
papers at a later date, inform him politely that it is
extremely important for you to have the papers
date-stamped immediately. Failure to do so could
result in a clerical filing error that might cause your
papers to be filed after the statute of limitations has
run. This could result in a dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds. Also, if there are two or more
clerks of the court, be sure to file with the proper
clerk. If you are not sure, file with both clerks.90
Enter the index number and date of filing on the
summons to be served upon the defendant(s).

90. See David D. Siegel, The Filing System That Takes Over On Janualy 1, 1993,
NO. 395 (1992). Professor Siegel discusses who is "the clerk
Part III, N.Y. ST. L. DIG.,
of the court." He reminds us that by statute it is the county clerk who is the clerk of both
LAW $5 525,
the supreme court and the county court in her county. See N.Y. COUNTY
909 (McKinney 1991 and Supp. 1993). However, in some places the supreme court and
county court have separate nonjudicial officers who do the filing for those courts. Their
offices may even be separated geographically. Professor Siegel suggests: "To be sure of
satisfying both the practicalities and the technical law, we've heard some lawyers say that
they file initiatory papers with both, when there are separate offices." Siegel, supra.
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Serve the defendant(s) within 120 days of the filing
in step three. REMEMBER that New York
decisional law requires STRICT COMPLIANCE for
service of summons and complaint or summons and
notice. Failure to strictly comply with the service
statutes may result in a jurisdictional dismissal. The
dismissal is not fatal because plaintiff will have
another 120 days from the date of dismissal to
commence a new action and make proper service,
but who wants to do that?
File proof of service within 120 days of the filing.

4. New York Rule Dzrers From Federal Practice

Lawyers should note the following important differences between
federal filing requirements and the New York filing requirements.
First, in federal court actions the defendant must be served within 120
days from the date the summons and complaint is filed, but proof of
service can be made thereafter. CPLR 306-a requires both filing, service, and proof of service within the 120 day period. Also, in federal
practice the clerk of the court issues the summons. Second, under
federal law the 120 day service requirement is not applicable if service
is made on a defendant in a foreign country. New York's new filing
law does not provide for this exception. Third, Rule 6 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a motion to enlarge the 120 day
peri0d.9~ The New York law contains no such provision.
How will the New York filing law affect federal diversity actions?
In these actions timely service for limitations purposes must be measured by state, rather than federal law on the authority of Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp.92 Can the practitioner rely on the 120 days of
CPLR 306-b, or the 120 days of Rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure? Professor Siegel suggests "[a] better answer than the
right answer is to take steps that would satisfy both of them."93

5. Impact on Provisional Remedies
The new laws do not affect provisional remedies but the practitioner should remember that in attachment practice, service must be
91. See FED.R. CIV. P. 6.
92. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
93. See David D. Siegel, Filing System, Part IV, N.Y. ST. L. DIG., No. 396 (1992).
Kudos to Professor Siegel for his four digest articles discussing the new filing laws.
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made within the sixty day period required by CPLR 6213. Also, in lis
pendens cases, under CPLR 65 12 the technical effectiveness of the notice provided by a notice of pendency depends on service within 30
days after filing.

6. Default Judgements
Assuming proof of service is filed within the 120 period following
filing, the new scheme does not appear to impact on default judgments, except that a defaulting defendant, who has a valid claim that
jurisdiction was not obtained, may get out from under the default
under CPLR 5015(a)(4). In this situation, the plaintiff would be free
to take advantage of CPLR 306-b, possibly at a dramatically long delay from the commencement of the original action.

Z RJI Forms
Requests for Judicial Intervention ("RJI") are not affected by the
new legislation. Remember that under the new IAS rules, effective
January 1, 1993, preliminary conferences will occur within forty-five
days of the filing of an RJI, unless the parties complete and submit an
agreed-upon disclosure schedule on a form order before the
conference.g4

8. Matrimonial Actions
Matrimonial actions are commenced by filing, and not service.
Although the new laws contain minor amendments to Domestic Relations Law 2ll,95 it should be noted that statute of limitations
problems seldom occur in matrimonial matters.

9. New Rules Not Applicable in Inferior Courts
The Uniform District Court Act, the New York City Civil Court
Act, the Uniform City Court Act, and the Uniform Justice Court Act
specifically state the new filing laws do not apply in district, city, civil,
and justice courts.96 Also, the new laws do not apply in the Court of
Claims.9' Thus, the practitioner must remember that in these courts
the statute of limitations will be stopped only by properly making ser94.
95.
96.
97.

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See N.Y. DOM.REL. LAW 5 211 (McKinney 1988 62 Supp. 1992).
See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
See N.Y.CT.CL.ACT 5 10 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1992).
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vice of summons and complaint or summons and notice on the defendant. If the plaintiff fails to do so and the statute of limitations has
expired, the action is dismissed and plaints will not be allowed to
recommence it.g8
10. Problem Areas (What zLf Things Go Wrong?)

(a) Single Defendant Lawsuits
CPLR 306-b(a) and (b) must be read together because, even if
the plaintiff fails to comply with the 120 day requirement of subsection (a), he still has a second bite at the apple. The following examples illustrate how the new scheme works.

EXAMPLE I
The summons and complaint are filed on April 1, 1993, the day
the statute of limitations expires. The 120 day period within which to
serve defendant and file proof of service runs out on August 1, 1993.
If proof of service is not filed, or if defendant does not appear, or if
defendant is not served by August 1, 1993, (and proof of service made
on that date) the action is "deemed dismissed." But, according to
CPLR 306-b(b), plaintiff has 120 days from August 1, 1993 (or until
December 1, 1993)' to file a "new" summons and complaint or summons and notice, purchase a "new" index number, properly serve the
defendant, and file proof of service in the "new" action against the
defendant.

EXAMPLE II
As in Example I, filing occurs on April 1, 1993. The process
server subsequently returns with an affidavit of service, which indicates that service was made on June 1, 1993. Proof of service is filed
within a few days after plaintiff's lawyer receives the affidavit. Defendant makes a timely motion before Justice S to dismiss, correctly
showing (as it turns out) that service was botched. Justice S's calendar rules are such that the motion is not heard until August 1, 1993
and not decided until December 1, 1993, when by decision order Justice S dismisses the action. CPLR 306-b(b) allows plaintiff 120 days
from December 1, 1993 (or until April 1,1994), to file a summons and

98. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1991 Survey, supra note 34, at 123.
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complaint or summons and notice, serve the defendant and file proof
of service in a "new" action against the defendant.
EXAMPLE III
As in Example I, filing occurs on April 1, 1993. The process
server makes service by leave and mail, or nail and mail under CPLR
308 and returns with an affidavit of service which indicates that the
leave or nail was completed on July 15, 1993, and the mailing was
completed on July 25, 1993. CPLR 308(2) and (4) require that proof
of service be filed with the clerk of the court designated in the summons within twenty days of the mailing. Does the plaintiff have until
August 5, 1993, to file proof of service or does the 120 day period in
CPLR 306-b(a) govern and require plaintiff to file proof of service by
August 1, 1993? If plaintiff fails to make proof of service by August 1,
1993, the action will automatically be deemed dismissed. Plaintiff will
then have to file a "new" action, purchase a new index number, and
start over again.

(b) Multi-Defendant Lawsuits
In multi-defendant lawsuits, filing with the clerk of the court will
satisfy the statute of limitations as to all defendants, but proof of service must be filed within 120 days as to each defendant who has not
appeared. The action is "deemed dismissed" as to any defendant who
has not been served, and as to whom proof of service has not been
filed, by the end of the 120 day period. The examples above also serve
to illustrate the consequences of dismissal as to one of several co-defendants. Note that when a "new" action is commenced as to the codefendant, separate actions (the original action plus the "new" action)
exist. As a consequence, assuming the "new" action satisfies the
CPLR scheme, plaintiff should make a motion to consolidate the original and "new" actions.
Finally, mention should be made of the obvious fact that judicial
interpretation will be crucial to the application of the new filing laws
and until decisions are rendered the practitioner should proceed with
caution.99 Also, it would appear that defendants draw no terminal
99. See Farmer v. King, No. 17618 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. Oct. 14, 1992). In
Farmer, petitioner timely began a proceeding by filing an order to show cause and petition to challenge the result of a primary election. The petition was dismissed for failure
to effectuate it within the time required by the order to show cause. Within fifteen days
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advantage from successfully challenging the adequacy of service in
supreme and county court civil actions because of the grace period
provided by CPLR 306-b(b). However, "hardball" defendants can be
expected to file CPLR 3211(a)(8) defenses. Similarly, there seems to
be no reason for the plaintiff to appeal a trial judge's grant of a motion
to dismiss for lack of proper service because commencement of a
"new" action would solve the problem considerably faster and
cheaper than an appeal. We thank Professor Farrell for his thoughtful input on the new filing law.

During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals issued at least
three important statute of limitations opinionsl* and one opinion regarding the timely filing of a notice of claim.101 Also, several appellate divisions issued opinions worthy of mention.lo2
A.

I.

Court of Appeals

CPLR 203(b) Interposition of Claim and the "United In
Interest" Doctrine

In Mondello v. The New York Blood Center,l03 the Court of Appeals examined and clarified the "united in interest" doctrine provided for in CPLR 203(b).l04 This is a relation back rule which
provides, in pertinent part, that a "claim asserted in the complaint is
interposed against the defendant or co-defendant united in interest . . .
when . . . the summons is served upon the defendant . . . ."10s The
appellate division, in Brock v. Bua,lo6 gave the rule a three-prong
specificity, patterned largely after the federal "relation back" test

from the dismissal, petitioner began a new proceeding by filing a second order to show
cause with the clerk. Respondents moved to dismiss the petition as time barred and the
petitioner opposed the motion based upon the fifteen day extension required by CPLR
306-b(a). Justice Ingrassia granted a motion to dismiss. He reasoned that election cases
have a statute of limitations of only ten days and that the extension sought by the petitioner was one and one-half times greater than the statute of limitations and that to hold
otherwise would frustrate the clear intention of the election law.
100. See infra notes 103-157 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 158-163 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 168-180 and accompanying text.
103. 80 N.Y.2d 219, 604 N.E.2d 81, 590 N.Y.S.2d 19 (1992).
104. See N.Y. CPLR 203(b) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
105. Id.
106. 83 A.D.2d 61, 443 N.Y.S.2d 407 (2d Dep't 1981).

Heinonline - - 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 81 1993

82

Syracuse Law Review

pol. 4465

codified in Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.107 The
Brock test examines whether (1) both claims arose out of the same
conduct, transaction, or occurrence; (2) the new party is united in
interest with the original defendant, and by reason of that relationship
can be charged with such notice of the institution of the action that
the new party will not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense on the
merits by the delayed, otherwise stale commencement; and (3) the
new party knew or should have known that, but for an excusable mistake by the plaintiff in originally failing to identify all the proper parties, the action would have been brought against the additional party
united in interest as well.108 All three features must be met for the
statutory relation-back remedy to be operative. log
The Mondello case originated with the deaths, apparently of
complications from AIDS-related diseases, of an infant child in late
1986 and her mother in early 1987. In 1984, the mother received
intravenous transfusions of apparently HIV-infected blood. Her widower instituted an action in 1987 against defendant-appellant New
York Hospital ("Hospital") and several physicians on behalf of himself and his deceased spouse's and daughter's estates. After some discovery, the 1987 complaint was amended in 1989 to add the New
York Blood Center ("Blood Center") as a defendant. The Court of
Appeals noted that the controversy was "still at its early but critical
motion stages"ll0 and framed the issue as to "whether the wrongful
death causes of action against the Blood Center were started too late
and are thus time barred."lll The Court stated, "[u]nless the defendant Hospital and putative defendant Blood Center are 'united in interest' within the meaning of CPLR 203(b) and Brock v. Bua,l12 the
wrongful death causes of action against the party added in 1989, defendant Blood Center, are concededly untimely and cannot be related
back to the timely commenced action against defendant Hospital."llJ
The supreme court had dismissed those causes of action against the
Blood Center which sounded in strict product liability and breach of
warranty but declined on prematurity grounds to dismiss causes

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See FED.R. CIV.P. 15(c)
Brock, 83 A.D.2d at 69, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
See id.
See Mondello, 80 N.Y.2d at 223, 604 N.E.2d at 83, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
Id.
83 A.D.2d at 61, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
Mondello, 80 N.Y.2d at 223, 604 N.E.2d at 83, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 21.
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against the Blood Center sounding in negligence for loss of services
and for conscious pain and suffering. These were deemed governed by
the "toxic substance" discovery rule of CPLR 214-c and, thus, additional disclosure would be necessary to ascertain the dispositive discovery date.114
The Court of Appeals noted that the only part of the supreme
court's ruling before it was the dismissal of the wrongful death causes
of action against the Blood Center on statute of limitations
grounds."S The supreme court had explained that the two year bar of
Estates, Powers and Trusts Law ("EPTL") section 5- 4.1 would apply
to those actions, unless plaintiff could demonstrate that the Blood
Center and the Hospital were united in interest within the meaning of
CPLR 203(b). The supreme court "concluded, however, that the Hospital and Blood Center were 'at a o s t joint tortfeasors and not parties
united in interest.' "u6 The Appellate Division for the First Department reversed the dismissal of the wrongful death causes of action."'
"It adopted and applied the relation back test formulated by the Appellate Division, Second Department, in Brock v. Bua."l The Court
of Appeals, by Judge Bellacosa, identified the second prong of the
Brock unity of interest test as "the central dispositive focus of this
appeal.""9 Judge Bellacosa reasoned that the appellate division had
erred when it failed to address the question of whether "the facts of
this case might present an exception to the general rule that parties
are not liable for the negligence of independent contractors either because plaintiff reasonably looked only to the Hospital for the performance of the service . . . or because the harm caused arose from a
danger inherent in the work."l20 Judge Bellacosa stated, "[wle find it
necessary to address and resolve the latter questions because plaintiff
now concedes that the regulation relied on by the parties and appellate division up to this point in the litigation was not in effect at the
relevant time at issue. It simply is not dispositive in this case."l21
After a lengthy analysis with respect to vicarious liability, the Court
reversed the appellate division and held that the interest of the Hospi114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 22425, 604 N.E.2d at 84, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
Id. at 225, 604 N.E.2d at 84, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
Id.
Id.
Mondello, 80 N.Y.2d at 225, 604 N.E.2d at 84, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225-26, 604 N.E.2d at 84, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
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tal and the Blood Center in the subject matter was not such that they
stood or fell together so that a judgment against one would similarly
affect the other.
2.

CPLR 205(a): Six Month Extension Not Available in Court of
Claims Action

In Dreger v. New York State Thruway Authority,l23 the Court of
Appeals again had an opportunity to address the question of what
constitutes timely commencement for purposes of allowing a recommencement of an action under CPLR 205(a).124 In the principal case
and two companion cases,12' counsel for plaintiffs had not strictly followed the Court of Claims Act procedure for filing a notice of claim.
The Court of Appeals, in a memorandum opinion, began by stating,
"[iln each of these actions a claim against the State or the Thruway
Authority was dismissed for failure to serve a copy of the claim on the
Attorney General in the manner prescribed by the Court of Claims
The Court noted that "in Dreger, the claimant
Act [section] 1
served the Thruway Authority but neglected to serve the Attorney
General. In the [companion cases], copies of the claims were mailed
to the Attorney General but were not sent by certified mail as the
statute requires. Because of these failures, the actions were subsequently dismissed and time-barred."l27 The Court noted that "[tlhe
Court of Claims Act contains no recommencement provision of its
own, but [that] section lO(6) expressly incorporates the time limitations and tolling provisions of article 2 of the CPLR . . . ."128 The
Court then stated, "[tlhus, these actions may be recommenced if they
qualify for recommencement under CPLR 205(a)"129and framed the
question on appeal as "whether these claimants failed to meet the
statutory timely commencement requirement because of their failure
to serve the Attorney General properly."l30 The Court explained that

122. Id. at 226, 604 N.E.2d at 85, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
123. 81 N.Y.2d 721, 609 N.E.2d 111, 593 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1992).
124. N.Y. CPLR 205 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
125. See Charbonneau v. State & Dalton v. State, 81 N.Y.2d 721, 609 N.E.2d 111,
593 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1992).
126. Dreger, 81 N.Y.2d at 722, 609 N.E.2d at 1 1 1, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 758; see N.Y.
CT.CL.ACT 5 11 (McKinney 1989).
127. Dreger, 81 N.Y.2d at 722-23, 609 N.E.2d at 1 1 1, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
128. Id. at 723, 609 N.E.2d at 112, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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"Court of Claims Act, section 11 establishes a notice requirement in
addition to that which may be applicable under other statutes."l31 It
mandates serving a copy of the claim or notice of intention on the
Attorney General, either personally or by certified mai1.132 The Court
of Appeals further explained that "both filing with the court and service on the Attorney General must occur within the applicable limitations period, and there is no basis for believing that the Legislature
intended filing to independently constitute commencement."~33
The Court of Appeals concluded that "[blecause suits against the
State are allowed only by the State's waiver of sovereign immunity
and in derogation of the common law, statutory requirements conditioning suit must be strictly construed."134 The Court stated,
"[a]ccordingly, where, as here, claimants have not met the literal requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11, their actions are not timely
commenced, and relief under CPLR 205(a) is not available."l35 ThenJudge Kaye filed a strong dissent.136 She stressed that the Court of
Appeals has long recognized that a CPLR 205(a) request to recommence a dismissed action must be liberally viewed.1S7 Judge Kaye,
relying on the words of former Chief Judge Cardozo, argued that the
"broad and liberal purpose" of CPLR 205(a) should not be "frittered
away by any narrow construction."l3* She explained that the Court
of Claims Act, in contrast to the CPLR, does not specify when an
action is "commenced."l39 Thus, Judge Kaye concluded,
In the CPLR, the Legislature chose to prescribe when an action is
commenced, and those requirements must be literally satisfied
before relief can be allowed under CPLR 205(a). The Legislature
may well choose a parallel course for the Court of Claims Act.
Unless and until it does so, however, this Court should not itself
impose requirements that deny plaintiffs the intended benefit of
CPLR 205(a).

131. Id. at 724, 609 N.E.2d at 112, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
132. Dreger, 81 N.Y.2d at 724, 609 N.E.2d at 112, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 724-25, 609 N.E.2d at 112-13, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 759-60.
137. Dreger, 81 N.Y.2d at 724-25, 609 N.E.2d at 113, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (Kaye,
J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 724, 609 N.E.2d at 112-13, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 759-60.
139. Id. at 725, 609 N.E.2d at 113, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
140. Id.
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3. CPLR 208: Infancy Toll Not Applicable in Wrongful Death
Action
In Baez v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.,141 the primary issue presented was whether CPLR 208 applied to toll the statute of limitations for commencing a cause of action for "wrongful
death and conscious pain and suffering on behalf of infant beneficiaries where the decedent's will named plaintiff executrix of her estate and stated that plaintiff should be appointed guardian for her
infant children."142
On April 17, 1986, Rosa Caraballo died while receiving treatment at a hospital owned and operated by the defendant.143 Prior to
her death she had executed a will naming her mother, Carmen Baez,
~~
executrix of her estate and guardian of her infant ~ h i l d r e n . 1"On
October 7, 1986, testamentary letters were issued to Baez authorizing
her to administer her daughter's estate."145 "Letters of guardianship
for the decedent's two children were issued to Carmen Baez on November 18, 1986."146 "On January 5, 1987 Carmen Baez, on behalf of
the infants, filed a notice of claim for wrongful death and conscious
pain and suffering against the defendant."147 On July 24, 1987, more
than one year and ninety days after her daughter's death, Baez served
a summons and complaint upon the defendant and started a second
wrongful death case against two doctors who allegedly operated on
The supreme court denied a motion to dismiss on the
the de~edent.14~
grounds that the applicable statute of limitations was tolled until the
date of the guardian's appointment.149 The appellate division reversed the judgment and held that the limitations period began to run
on the date of decedent's death rather than on the date of the appointment of decedent's mother as executrix or guardian and, as there was
an adult relative of the deceased who could have instituted the action
on behalf of the decedent, a toll for infancy was unavailable.150 The

141. 80 N.Y.2d 571, 607 N.E.2d 787, 592 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1992).
142. Id. at 574, 607 N.E.2d at 787, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
143. Id. at 574-75, 607 N.E.2d at 788, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
144. Id. at 575, 607 N.E.2d at 788, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
145. Id.
146. Baez, 80 N.Y.2d at 575, 607 N.E.2d at 788, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Baez v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 168 A.D.2d 529, 563 N.Y.S.2d 89
(2d Dep't 1990).
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appellate division granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal to the
Court of Appeals.151
The Court of Appeals pointed out that under the Estates Powers
and Trust Law section 5- 4.1,152 personal representatives of a decedent
have two years, measured from the date of death, in which to commence a wrongful death cause of action.153 The Court also noted that
at the time the present litigation was commenced, a one-year and
ninety day statute of limitations applied to actions brought against the
defendant and its employees.154 The Court distinguished Ratka v. St.
Francis Hospital,l55 and Hernandez v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp.,Is and stated:
In this case, the decedent's will named plaintiff Baez executrix of
her estate. Upon her daughter's death, plaintiff Baez could have
timely sought appointment as a personal representative to commence the actions on behalf of the infant children and her failure
to do so does not suspend the running of the applicable limitations
period. The actions against defendants are untimely because they
were not commenced until after the one year and 90-day statutory
period had expired.15'

4.

Notice of Claim Dismissed for Failure to Comply With General
Municipal Law

In Pedrero v. Moreau,l58 the Court of Appeals, in a memorandum opinion, reversed the order of the appellate division and held
that plaintiff had failed to follow the notice of claim procedure set
forth in General Municipal Law 50-d(1).159 The Court explained that
plaintiff, born June 3, 1970, commenced this malpractice action
against six physicians for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of a
negligently-induced premature birth.160 "In 1982, a notice of claim
was served upon the Comptroller of the City of New York, and in
1983, the supreme court permitted plaintiff to serve late notice of
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 529, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
LAW5 5-4.1 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1992).
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
Baez, 80 N.Y.2d at 576, 607 N.E.2d at 788, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
Id.
44 N.Y.2d 604,378 N.E.2d 1027, 407 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1978).
78 N.Y.2d 687, 585 N.E.2d 822, 578 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1991).
Baez, 80 N.Y.2d at 576, 607 N.E.2d at 788-89, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 641-42.
81 N.Y.2d 731, 609 N.E.2d 117, 593 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1992).
N.Y. GEN.MUN. LAW 5 50-d(1) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1992).
Pedrero, 81 N.Y.2d at 732, 609 N.E.2d at 117, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
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claim."l61 The Court of Appeals held that the notice served on the
city was untimely since it was served more than ten years after plaintiff's
The Court concluded, "[tlhus if such notice was a prerequisite to this action, [the] Supreme Court properly dismissed the
compIaint."163

B.

Other Opinions

I. Continuous Treatment Doctrine
Under the doctrine of continuous treatment, the statute of limitations is tolled until after the course of treatment. Continuous treatment includes the wrongful acts or omissions that have run
continuously and are related to the same original condition of com~ 1 a i n t . lThe
~ ~ applicability of the continuous treatment doctrine requires that there be more than merely a continuing relationship
between the physician and the patient.165 The underlying rationale is
the existence of a continuing trust and confidence which warrants the
tolling of the limitations period.l66 Thus, continuous treatment contemplates scheduled appointments for future visits and, absent a clear
agency relationship, the doctrine cannot be imputed from one doctor
to another.167 During the Survey year, two appellate divisions
reached different decisions on the question of what constitutes a legally relevant relationship sufficient for imputation
In Raymonde Pierre-Louis v. Ching- Yuan Hwa, '69 the Appellate
Division for the Second Department was faced with the question of
whether continuous treatment provided by others at the defendants'
hospital was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. The appellate
division stressed that "a continued relationship must be shown between the treating doctor and the misdiagnosing defendant in order to

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See McDermott v. Torre, 56 N.Y.2d 399, 405, 437 N.E.2d 1108, 1 1 10, 452
N.Y.S.2d 351, 353 (1982) (quoting Borgia v. City o f N.Y., 12 N.Y.2d 151, 189 N.E.2d
777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962)).
165. McDermott, 56 N.Y.2d at 405, 437 N.E.2d at 1110, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See Siege1 v. W a n k , 183 A.D.2d 158, 589 N.Y.S.2d 934 (3d Dep't 1992);
Raymonde Pierre-Louis v. Ching-Yuan Hwa, 182 A.D.2d 55, 587 N.Y.S.2d 17 (2d Dep't
1992).
169. Raymonde Pierre-Louis, 182 A.D.2d at 55, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
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prolong the statute of limitations against the latter."l70 The appellate
division concluded that the plaintiff had "failed to demonstrate the
existence of a legally-relevant relationship between the defendants and
the subsequently treating Downstate d0ctors."l7~ The court stated,
"[tlhat the defendants and their successors were 'co-employees' of
Downstate is insufficient for the imputation of the latter's continuous
treatment to the former for the purpose of tolling the statute of
limitations."172
In Siegel v Wank,l73 the Appellate Division for the Third Department affirmed the supreme court's denial of a CPLR 3211(a)(5)
motion to dismiss. On July 12, 1988, defendant Watson and defendant
Wank performed dental implant surgery on the ~1aintiff.l~~
Plaintiff
experienced various complications and underwent additional procedures with Dr. Watson.175 She then commenced an action for dental
malpractice against the defendants and served Dr. Wank with a summons and notice on February 15, 1991.176 He moved to dismiss on
the grounds of statute of limitations.177 Plaintiff alleged that when she
first experienced problems following the initial surgery, Dr. Watson
told her that he had consulted with Dr. Wank who, in turn, "advised
[Watson] to perform a surgical procedure to clean out the area
around the implants."l7* Plaintiff also alleged that Dr. Watson consulted with Dr. Wank on a regular basis throughout the course of her
treatment and that this constituted a legally relevant relationship sufficient for imputation
The appellate division held that
plaintiff had averred evidentiary facts, albeit hearsay, to raise a question of fact as to the applicability of the continuous treatment
doctrine.180
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 59, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
Id. at 59, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
Id.
Siegel, 183 A.D.2d at 158, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
Id. at 159, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Siegel, 183 A.D.2d at 160, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
Id. at 161, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
Id.
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2. CPLR 214-c: Microwave Radiation Is 'Substance" and 214-c(4)
Is Expansively Applied
In Ford v. American Telephone Co.,l81 "a former navy member
who allegedly contracted lymphoma as a result of exposure to microwave radiation while he was stationed aboard a navy vessel [from
1965-19671 brought a personal injury action against the entities responsible for the design, construction, manufacture, or installation of
the on-board radar equipment."l82
On motions for summary judgment, the Supreme Court held . . .
that: (1) microwave radiation was a 'substance' within the meaning
of the statute extending the three-year statute of limitations for injury caused by the latent effects of exposure to a substance, and (2)
the one year limitation on bringing an action after discovering
cause of the injury applies only when the cause of the injury is
discovered more than two years after the discovery of the existence
of the injury and, thus, operates only to extend the three-year statute of limitations. lS3

3. Federal Law Governs Some Questions of m e n a Federal Claim
Accrues
In Morse v. University of Vermont,lS4 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reminded the bench and bar that federal law governs the question of when a federal claim accrues notwithstanding that a state statute of limitations is to be used.lg5 The court
held that the plaintiff's action under a section of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. section 794 (1988), was governed by the state
statute of limitations applicable to a personal injury action. In this
respect, the practitioner should be alerted to 28 U.S.C. section 1658186
which enacts a general four year statute of limitations respecting civil
actions arising under Acts of Congress that do not specifically set
forth a period of limitations. This provision applies only to causes of
action arising under legislation that Congress enacts after December
1, 1990.187Thus, the new statute is not retroactive. Also, the new
-

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

-

-

-

154 Misc. 2d 894, 586 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1992).
Id. at 894, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
Id.
973 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 125.
See 28 U.S.C. 5 1658 (1992).
Id.
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statute does not consider whether there should be tolling provisions
applicable to federal statutes of limitations and does not incorporate
applicable state tolling provisions by reference. The practitioner is
reminded that the new statute is not applicable in diversity cases
where state limitation periods and tolling provisions are applied.lS8

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The most important subject matter jurisdiction decision rendered
during the Survey year is the United States Supreme Court's opinion
in American National Red Cross v. S. G..I89 A blood recipient brought
a state court action against the American National Red Cross to recover for AIDS allegedly caused by contaminated blood. Red Cross
removed the suit to federal court. The United States Supreme Court,
in a closely divided opinion, held that the Red Cross charter created
original federal jurisdiction over suits involving the Red Cross.l90
This decision has important implications for the New York practitioner because whenever a statute granting a federally chartered corporation the "power to sue and be sued" specifically mentions the
federal courts, the law will be deemed to confer on federal district
courts jurisdiction over any and all controversies to which that corporation is a party. Since there are hundreds of federally chartered corporations, the plaintiff's lawyer who files his tort case in the Bronx
Supreme Court may have the case removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Manhattan or
White Plains.

B. In Personam Jurisdiction
There are several Survey year cases worthy of mention. One federal district court has established special jurisdictional rules to handle
mass tort litigation191 and several appellate divisions have issued important opinions regarding long-arm jurisdiction and the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.192 In addition, there are many strict
-

188. For a fuller discussion of the new federal statute of limitations see David D.
Siegel, The Statute of Limitations in Federal Practice, Including the New "General" One
in Federal Questions Cases, 134 F.R.D. 481 (1991).
189. 112 S. Ct. 2465 (1992).
190. Id. at 2465.
191. In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
192. See infra notes 207-11 and notes 224-26 and accompanying text.
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compliance and summons cases1g3and several instructive opinions regarding the waiver of jurisdictional defenses.194Also, we note the first
decision discussing the Inter-American Convention on Letters
Rogatory. 195

I. Broad Jurisdiction Ruling in DES Cases
In In re DES Ca~es,l9~
Judge Weinstein announced a new approach to determining whether in personam jurisdiction exists over
defendants in mass tort litigation. His approach rejects the time-worn
territorial nexus approach.197 Judge Weinstein reasoned that once a
plaintiff demonstrates that the state where a lawsuit is fded has an
"adequate" interest to support jurisdiction, even if it is non-territorial,
a prima facie case for jurisdiction can be made.198 Judge Weinstein
also held that a defendant could avoid in personam jurisdiction if it
could demonstrate the lawsuit would cause it "relatively substantial
hardship."l99

2. Long-Arm Jurisdiction Under CPLR 302(a)(I)
In Bank of New York v. Strurn0r,~o0the appellate division held
that a New Mexico maker of a note was subject to in personam jurisdiction in New York in an action to recover on the note. The defendant had signed the note in New Mexico and the proceeds of the note
were payable in New York and to be used to finance the purchase of a
New York limited partnership. The note was also secured by an
agreement pledging the maker's shares in the limited partnership, and
the pledge agreement provided that any question would be governed
l appellate division held that the totality of
by New York l a ~ . ~ OThe
the defendant's acts, whereby he availed himself of the benefits and
protection of New York law, demonstrated sufficient purposeful activity in New York to constitute a transaction of business under CPLR
302(a)(l). In Glass Contractors v. Target Supply and Display, Inc. ,202
193. See infra notes 212-23 and accompanying text.
194. See infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
195. See infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
196. DES cases, 789 F. Supp. at 552.
197. Id. at 585.
198. Id. at 587.
199. Id.
200. 179 A.D.2d 736, 579 N.Y.S.2d 124 (2d Dep't 1992).
201. Id. at 736, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 124.
202. 152 Misc. 2d 782, 587 N.Y.S.2d 471 (Sup. Ct. App. Term, 2d & 11th Jud. Dist.
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the appellate term reminded the bench and bar that, when reviewing
default judgments, New York courts must limit their inquiry to ascertaining whether courts of foreign jurisdictions possess personal jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to their long-arm statutes and
not CPLR 302.203 In this sense, New York has a restricted long-arm
statute that does not go as far as long-arm statutes of many other
Finally, in Mareno v. Jet Aviation of America, Inc. ,205 the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reminded the bench and bar that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I I sanctions may be imposed on lawyers who fail to do their long-arm jurisdictional research.206
3. Long-Arm Jurisdiction Under CPLR 302(b)

CPLR 302(b)207permits the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
in a matrimonial action or family court proceeding involving a claim
for support, alimony, maintenance, a distributive award or other special relief. The party seeking such relief must be a New York resident
or domiciliary and must further provide (1) New York was the marital domicile of the parties before separation; or (2) the defendant
abandoned the plaintiff in New York; or (3) the obligation to provide
the relief accrued under the laws of New York; or (4) the obligation to
provide such relief arose out of an agreement executed in New York.
Interpretation of this statute has been characterized by a cautious attention to the due process limits lurking in the background.
During the Survey year the Appellate Division, Third Department upheld long-arm jurisdiction and gave an expansive interpretation to the issue of what constitutes the matrimonial domicile of the
parties before their separation.208 Other appellate divisions have read
1992). See also China Express, Inc. v. Volpi & Son Machine Corp., 126 A.D.2d 239, 513
N.Y.S.2d 388 (1st Dep't 1987) (Where a sister state's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction is
challenged in an action on a foreign judgment, the law of that state determines whether
jurisdiction was properly asserted. This is true even if that state's long-am statute is at
odds with our rule.).
203. Glass Contractors, 152 Misc. 2d at 783, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
204. See David D. Siegel, The Afliction Known As Long Arm Jurisdiction, N.Y. L.J.,
May 31, 1988, at 5.
205. 970 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1992).
206. Id. at 1126. See also International Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875
F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1989) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions applicable on
plaintiffs attorney in the amount of $10,000 for failure to do jurisdictional research).
207. See N.Y. CPLR 302(b) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
208. See Levy v. Levy, 185 A.D.2d 15, 592 N.Y.S.2d 480 (3d Dep't 1993).
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CPLR 302(b) more restrictively and the Court of Appeals is expected
to clarify the different approaches.209
In Levy v. Levy,210 the parties married in New York in 1970.
They moved to Massachusetts in 1974 and to Texas in 1976. They
reestablished their marital domicile in New York in August 1979 and
moved to California in 1981. In 1982, plaints returned to New York
with her two daughters. Defendant moved to New York in 1987 and
resided there until he moved to New Jersey in 1988. In the fall of
1989, defendant moved to Washington where he still resides. He visited New York on numerous occasions and often stayed with plaintiff
and his daughters where the parties presented themselves to the community as a family. The Third Department recognized that other appellate divisions had restrictively construed the meaning of
"matrimonial domicile" for purposes of CPLR 302(b), but held that
there were sufficient contacts by defendant with New York to comply
with constitutional due process concerns relating to the application of
the ~tatute.~ll
4. Strict Compliance Cases

We again remind the bench and bar that courts require strict
compliance for service of summons and complaint or summons and
notice.212 This is important because in most courts, other than those
subject to the new filing requirements,213 a defect in service dismisses

209. See Richardson v. Richardson, 58 A.D.2d 861, 396 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1st Dep't
1977); Lieb v. Lieb, 53 A.D.2d 67, 385 N.Y.S.2d 569 (2d Dep't 1976); Paparella v.
Paparella, 74 A.D.2d 106, 426 N.Y.S.2d 610 (4th Dep't 1980); Klette v. Klette, 167
A.D.2d 197, 561 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1st Dep't 1990).
210. Levy, 185 A.D.2d at 15, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
211. Id.
212. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1991 Survey, supra note 34, at 123. Strict compliance is crucial in all courts where an action is deemed commenced by properly sewing
the defendant with summons and notice or summons and complaint. Thus, in the New
York civil, city, district and other courts not covered by the new filing law failure to meet
the strict compliance requirements can result in a jurisdictional dismissal and if the statute of limitations has expired the action will be dismissed and not receive the six month
extension under CPLR 205 for recommencement of the action. In the supreme and
county courts where an action is deemed commenced upon filing, the plaintiff is still
required to comply with applicable service statutes in order to obtain jurisdiction over the
defendant. If the plaintiff fails to comply with the statute and a defendant moves to
dismiss for jurisdictional grounds, the action will be dismissed but even if the statute of
limitations has run, plaintiff can file a second action. See N.Y. CPLR 306-b (McKinney
1990 & Supp. 1992).
213. N.Y. CPLR 306-b (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
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the action and if the dismissal occurs after the applicable statute of
limitations has expired, there is no six-month grace period under
CPLR 205(a).214 The lawyer must debrief the process server.215
Most strict compliance cases arise in supreme court actions.
Since the new filing laws are applicable in supreme court, it is possible
that fewer jurisdictional defenses will be raised by defendants because
there is little to gain by a dismissal of the plaintiff's action. Also, it is
unlikely that plaintiffs will appeal jurisdictional dismissals in supreme
court because it will be faster and cheaper to file a new action as permitted by CPLR 306-b(b).216 Nonetheless, we remind the reader that
defense counsel frequently enjoy annoying counsel for plaintiffs. Failure to adhere to the requirements of the strict compliance service statutes may require the plaintiff to file a new action, pay for a new index
number and then properly re-serve the defendant. Why waste the
time? Finally, we alert the practitioner to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit's decision in Buggs v. Ehrnschwender,217 which reminds the bar that long-arm jurisdiction in federal courts is frequently
dependent upon whether the plaintiff strictly followed New York
State statutory procedures for service of process.218

5. Summons Practice
In order to meet the requirement that the summons filed with the
county clerk be served on a defendant within the required time period, the summons served must be exactly the same as the summons
filed.219 Variations in summons could be fatal. In Scaringi v. Broome
, ~ ~supreme
~
court held that no action is properly
Realty C ~ r p . .the
commenced if either service of summons or the substance and content
of the summons are not in compliance with the statutory mandate.221
Also, in Santopolo v. Turner Construction
the appellate division reminded the bench and bar that failure to obtain leave of court
to add a new party to an action may be waived and is not fatal, even
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

214. See N.Y. CPLR 205(a) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
215. See Farrell, Good Old Unreliable Service Under New York's "Nail and Mail"
Statute, N.Y. L.J., July 28, 1987, at 1.
216. See N.Y. CPLR 306-b(b) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
217. 968 F.2d 1544 (2d Cir. 1992).
218. Id. at 1548.
219. OSCARG. CHASE,ET AL., CPLR MANUAL5 3.13 (1986)
220. 191 A.D.2d 223, 594 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1st Dep't 1993).
221. Id. at 223, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
222. 181 A.D.2d 429, 580 N.Y.S.2d 755 (1st Dep't 1992).
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though such failure generally renders service on the new party a

C Jurisdiction Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
In Maureen S v. Margaret S.,224 the appellate division, by Justice
Miller, held that the family court properly invoked its emergency jurisdiction powers pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act ("UCCJA").225 The appellate division affirmed the family court's
decision to temporarily modify a custody award of another state. The
appellate division also considered a broader question of the appropriate communicative procedures provided for by the UCCJA, and how
in this case the New York family court did not utilize them to their
D. Appearance and Waiver of Jurisdictional Defenses
Several Survey articles have mentioned Addesso v. Shemtob.z2'
That case held that defendants seeking to take advantage of jurisdictional challenges must rigidly abide by the requirements of CPLR
321 1(e).228 During the Survey year two appellate divisions reminded
the bar that valid jurisdictional objections will be waived by failure to
raise them properly.229 In Wiesener v. Avis Rent-A-Car, I ~ c . , ~ J O the
Appellate Division, First Department held that failure to assert a specific objection to long-arm jurisdiction in an answer barred the assertion in a motion for summary judgrnent.231 The appellate division
stated, "[dlefendant, in its answer, asserted only a defense predicated
upon improper service, which it later conceded to be without
rne1it."~32 Similarly in Lauro v. Cr0nin,~3~
the Appellate Division,
Third Department held that a personal jurisdiction defense of imp

p

p

p

p

p

223. Id. at 429, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
224. 184 A.D.2d 159, 592 N.Y.S.2d 55 (2d Dep't 1992).
225. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW 5 75-d(l)(c)(ii)(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992).
226. See Maureen S , 184 A.D.2d at 165, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
227. 70 N.Y.2d 689, 512 N.E.2d 314, 518 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1987).
228. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1989 Survey, supra note 62, at 98-100.
229. See Wiesener v. Avis Rent-A-Car, Inc., 182 A.D.2d 372, 582 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1st
Dep't 1992); Lauro v. Cronin, 184 A.D.2d 837, 584 N.Y.S.2d 671 (3d Dep't 1992).
230. Wiesener, 182 A.D.2d at 372, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 373, 582 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
233. Lauro, 184 A.D.2d at 837, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
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proper service was waived where a pre-answer motion to dismiss did
not include the defense.

E. Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory
Prior Survey articles have discussed the Hague Convention and
concluded that failure to comply with it will result in a dismissal of
the plaintiff's action.234 In Torres v. Arocena,235 Justice Tompkins of
the supreme court reminded the bench and bar that the United States
is a signatory to the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory
and that failure to comply with the Convention's requirement that
service of process abroad be made in accordance with the law of the
state of destination preempts any inconsistent New York State service
of process
The bottom line is if the defendant resides in a
country that is a signatory to the Convention, the plaintiff must make
service in that country. The mandatory language in the Inter-American Convention is comparable to that of the Hague Service Convention which was discussed in VolkswagenWerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Schlunk 23'
IV. DISCLOSURE
CASES
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals settled a conflict
among the four appellate divisions and ruled that defense surveillance
films made to undermine a plaintiff's personal injury claims must be
disclosed.238 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that
client phone records are not protected from a government subpoena
on privilege grounds'239 and the Appellate Division, First Department
held that law firm tax records are not discoverable after the firm
breaks
Also, several lower courts issued interesting opinions
regarding the attorney-client privilege.241

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
N.Y.S.2d
239.
240.
241.

See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1988 Survey, supra note 63, at 108-09.
155 Misc. 2d 52, 587 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1992).
Torres, 155 Misc. 2d at 52, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
486 U.S. 694 (1988).
See DiMichel v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 80 N.Y.2d 184, 604 N.E.2d 63, 590
1 (1992).
See United States v. John Doe, 959 F.2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1992).
Gordon v. Grossman, 183 A.D.2d 669, 584 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1st Dep't 1992).
See infra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
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A. Disclosure of Videotapes Ordered
In DiMichel v. South Bufalo Railway Co.,242 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department held that a defendant must turn over any
surveillance tapes it intends to use at trial. The Fourth Department
reasoned that although the tapes were material prepared for litigation
they were discoverable on a showing "that the party seeking discovery
has a substantial need of the materials in preparation of the case and
is unable . . . to obtain [their] substantial equivalent by other
means."243 The appellate division authorized qualified discovery. The
Second Department reached a similar conclusion244 and the Third
Department ruled that the plaintiff could await the trial to challenge
the authenticity of the surveillance material~.24~The First Department held that surveillance materials were discoverable because they
were statements of the plaintiff and available under CPLR Section
3 101(e) during pre-trial inspection.246
A unanimous Court of Appeals, speaking through Chief Judge
Wachtler, adopted the Fourth Department's rationale. Chief Judge
Wachtler stated:
Having considered the different approaches, we agree with the Second, Third and Fourth Departments that surveillance films should
be treated as material prepared in anticipation of litigation, and as
such, are subject to a qualified privilege that can be overcome only
by a factual showing of substantial need and undue hardship.247

Chief Judge Wachtler rejected defendant's argument that the
plaintiff could tailor his testimony after viewing the surveillance material and noted that the material could be turned over after the plaintiff
had been dep0sed.~48
242. 80 N.Y.2d 184, 604 N.E.2d 63, 590 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1992).
243. See DiMichel v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 178 A.D.2d 914, 579 N.Y.S.2d 788
(4th Dep't 1991).
244. See Kane v. Her Pet Refrigeration, Inc., 181 A.D.2d 257, 587 N.Y.S.2d 339
(2d Dep't 1992).
245. See Careccia v. Enstron, 174 A.D.2d 48, 578 N.Y.S.2d 678 (3d Dep't 1992).
246. Marte v. Hickok Mfg. Co., 154 A.D.2d 173, 552 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1st Dep't
1990).
247. See DiMichel, 80 N.Y.2d at 196, 604 N.E.2d at 68, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
248. Id. at 197, 604 N.E.2d at 68, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
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B.

Client Phone Records Not Protected

In United States v. John Doe,249 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that telephone records given to a law firm by its
client are not protected from subpoena provided that the subpoena is
not drafted so as to reveal the firm's legal strategy.250 The government had served a federal grand-jury subpoena that sought phone
records from an unnamed client represented by the Manhattan law
firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison. The Court of Appeals ruled that the subpoena request did not violate the attorney
work-product, attorney-client, or Fifth Amendment privileges of the
client. Judge Amalya L. Kearse authored the opinion and was joined
by Judge Jon 0.Newman and retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall in a unanimous opinion.

C Law Firm Tax Records Not Available
In Gordon v. Grossman,z" the Appellate Division for the First
Department reversed an order granting disclosure of a portion of defendant's income tax returns in an action arising from the termination
of a law finn partnership.252 The appellate division held that disclosure of tax returns is disfavored because of their confidential and private nature. The appellate division stressed that the party seeking
disclosure must make a strong showing of necessity and demonstrate
that the information contained in the returns is unavailable from
other sources.2'3
D.

Other Discovery Opinions

In an apparent issue of first impression, Justice Silberman held
that an attorney who is a close friend of one spouse, but does not
represent her, is protected by the attorney-client privilege and cannot
be required to testify as to conversations about business and financial
concerns and how to proceed with the case.254 Relying on the Court
of Appeals decision in In re Priest v. Hennes~y,25~
Justice Silberman

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

959 F.2d 1158 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1158.
Gordon, 183 A.D.2d at 669, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
Id.
Id.
Nachman v. Nachman, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 22, 1993, at 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.).
51 N.Y.2d 62,409 N.E.2d 983,431 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1980).
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concluded in Nachman v. Nachman256 that an attorney-client relationship could exist between the spouse and her attorney friend even
though the latter perceived her role as one of an "ad~iser."~'~
In another issue of first impression, Justice Harold L. Wood ruled that an
attorney must either reveal his client's name or remain silent and risk
going to
Justice Wood ruled that even though the client faced
possible criminal prosecution as a hit and run driver, the attorneyclient privilege was not applicable.259 His ruling goes beyond the
Court of Appeals 1960 decision in Matter of Kaplan,260 where the
Court held the name of a client, whose lawyer had told authorities
about the bribery of city officials, did not have to be revealed because
the client feared reprisals.

During the Survey year, New York courts have issued many
opinions analyzing recently enacted sanction rules for civil litigat i ~ n Of
. ~particular
~ ~
interest is Justice Lebedeff's decision in In re
Entertainment Partners Group Inc. v. Davi~,26~
which rejected the argument that the language of CPLR 8303-a limits the recovery of costs
and attorney's fees to $10,000 for an entire action. Also, Guarnier v.
American Dredging Co.263should be noted because it is the first time
the Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's imposition of Part 130
sanctions against an attorney.
A. Background
In 1986 the Court of Appeals held, in A.G. Ship Maintenance
Corp. v. Lezak,264 that state courts do not have inherent power to impose sanctions on litigants and counsel. After A. G. Ship, the Legislature passed CPLR 8303-a which provides for costs upon frivolous
claims in actions to recover damages for personal injury, injury to
256. Nachman, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 22, 1993, at 1.
257. Id.
258. In re D'Alessio, 155 Misc. 2d 518,589 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co.
1992).
259. Id. at 521, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
260. In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d, 660, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1960).
261. See Carlisle, Judicial Seminars 1992 Legal Update on New York Civil Practice
(outline containing all sanction cases) (on file at Barclay Library).
262. 155 Misc. 2d 894, 590 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1992).
263. 79 N.Y.2d 846, 588 N.E.2d 92, 580 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1992).
264. 69 N.Y.2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 681, 511 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1986).
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property or wrongful death actions.265 The statute contemplates a
$10,000 monetary cap for each action.266 In 1989, Part 130 of the
Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts became effective.267
These rules, which apply to most New York State courts, permit the
court at its discretion to sanction any party or attorney in any civil
action or proceeding for frivolous conduct by imposing costs and reasonable attorney fees.268 In addition to, or in lieu of awarding costs
and fees to the other side, the court may, at its discretion, impose
financial sanctions upon any party or attorney for frivolous
conduct.269
Payments of sanctions by an attorney are deposited with the Clients' Security Fund.270 Payment of sanctions by a party who is not an
attorney are deposited with the clerk of the court for transmittal to
the State Commissioner of Taxation and Finance.Z7l An award for
costs and fees or sanctions may be sought by motion or by cross-motion, or may be made by the court sua ~ p o n t e .Part
~ ~ ~130-1.2 provides that an award of costs or an imposition of sanctions, or both,
can be granted only upon a written decision setting forth the conduct
on which the award or imposition is ba~ed.~'3The decision must state
the reasons why the court found the amount awarded or imposed to
be appropriate.274
Conduct is frivolous if: "(1) it is completely without merit in law
or fact and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; or (2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or
to harass or maliciously injure another."275 Part 130 also directs that
when determining whether the conduct undertaken was frivolous, the
court shall consider "the circumstances under which the conduct took
place, including the time available for investigating the legal or factual
basis of the conduct, and whether or not the conduct was continued

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

See
See
See
See
See

N.Y. CPLR 8303-a (McKinney Supp. 1993).
N.Y. CPLR 8303-a(a).
22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (1989).
id.
id.

Id.
See
See
See
See

id.
22 NYCRR 130-l.l(d).

id. 5 130-1.2.
id.

Id. 5 130-l.l(c)(l), (2).
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when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent or should have
been apparent to counse1."276 An award of costs or the imposition of
sanctions, or both, shall be entered as a judgment of the
The
total amount of costs awarded and sanctions imposed must not exceed
$10,000 in any action or proceeding.278

B. Guarnier v. American Dredging Co.
In Guarnier v. American Dredging Co. ,279 the Supreme Court for
New York County imposed Part 130 sanctions on defendant's counsel
sua sponte in the amount of $5,000.280 The trial judge had encountered difficulty in compelling one of the jurors to serve because of his
fears that jury service would put his employment at risk.281 The court
persuaded the juror to appear and he was seated with the panel to be
sworn en banc.2g2 "At this juncture the court inquired of counsel individually whether the jury was satisfactory."283 Defendant's counsel
responded that he did not think the juror should be forced to sit on
the jury.284 The court excused the jury and informed defendant's
counsel that costs would be assessed against him for plaintiff's counsel's time.285
The supreme court later issued its written decision addressing
defense counsel's conduct at the voir dire and concluded that the form
of counsel's objection was an improper attempt to curry favor with
the juror.286 The Appellate Division for the First Department recognized that the supreme court's assessment of costs in the amount of
$5,000 was not supported by a hearing mandated by the sanction
rules or by any specific findings of fact, but affirmed and reduced the
amount to $l,000.287 The Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds
that "the reviewable record of the conduct of the appellant attorney
during jury selection, which prompted the imposition of the sanction
276. Id. $ 130-l.l(~)(2).
277. See 22 NYCRR 130-1.2.
278. See id.
279. 79 N.Y.2d 846, 588 N.E.2d 92, 580 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1992).
280. See Guarnier v. American Dredging Co., 172 A.D.2d 220, 567 N.Y.S.2d 725
(1st Dep't 1991).
281. Id. at 220, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 725.
282. See id. at 221, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 726.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Guarnier, 172 A.D.2d at 221, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 726.
286. Id.
287. 179 A.D.2d 392, 577 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1st Dep't 1992).
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over two months later, [was] devoid of the required basis for concluding that the conduct . . . was 'frivolous' within the meaning of the
sanctions r~le."~88

C. Entertainment Partners Group, Inc. v. Davis
Entertainment Partners Group, Inc. v. Davis289 raised an issue of
first impression: Does the $10,000 specified in CPLR 8303-a290 apply
to the case as a whole, or does it permit higher total costs in a case?291
Justice Lebedeff held that the plain meaning of CPLR 8303-a permits,
but does not necessarily require, that the $10,000 maximum apply to
each prevailing party.292 She also found the statutory language permits consideration of a higher award to a given party for it supports a
cost award even upon a "claim" and a number of claims may be
raised against an individual party.293 Justice Lebedeff stated:
Had the legislature not intended to allow consideration of costs as
to multiple prevailing parties and multiple claims, even if the total
were in excess of $10,000, the language would have addressed costs
in the entire case, as is done in the text of the costs provisions in
real property actions and in difficult or complex cases, which address additional costs only on the entire 'action' (CPLR §§ 8302
and 8303), and in the sanctions provision of NYCRR 130-1.2 of
the Rules of the Chief Judge, which contains reference to a maximum amount of $10,000 in a single case.294

The Lebedeff scheme would allow a judge to impose a one million
dollar sanction on a plaintiff who had frivolously filed a complaint
with ten claims against ten defendants. This result seems incompatible with the legislative purpose of CPLR 8303-a.295

VI. THE LEGALPROFESSION
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals issued important
opinions regarding the liability of law firms to third parties and to

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Guarnier, 79 N.Y.2d at 846, 602 N.E.2d at 232, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
155 Misc. 2d 894, 590 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1992).
N.Y. CPLR 8303-a(a) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992).
See Entertainment Partners, 155 Misc. 2d at 895-96, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
Id. at 901, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
Id.
Id. at 901, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
See N.Y. CPLR 8303-a.
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former associates.296

A. Liability of Law Firms to Third Parties
In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Dewey, Ballan tine,
Bushby, Palmer & Wood,297the Court of Appeals ruled for the fist
time that lawyers may be liable to third parties for negligent representation "in the right circum~tances."29~Pursuant to its client's instructions, a defendant law firm furnished to a third party (Prudential) an
opinion letter that assertedly contained false assurances. The firm
had erroneously stated the outstanding balance on a first preferred
fleet mortgage securing the debt as $92,885 rather than the correct
sum of $92,885,000.299 As a result Prudential (the plaintiff) suffered
significant losses and sued the law firm, contending that the firm's
opinion letter had falsely assured it that the mortgage documents in
question would fully protect its existing $92,885,000 security interest.300 Prudential acknowledged that it was not in privity with the
law firm but argued that the relationship between them was sufficiently close so as to support a cause of action in negligence.301 Alternatively, it maintained that the firm could be held liable to it, in
contract, on a third party beneficiary theory.302 The Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Titone, stated, "[wlhile a law firm supplying such a letter may have a duty running to the third parties, the
record in this case does not support the conclusion that the assertion
in the opinion letter caused plaintiff's loss."303 The Prudential Insurance Co. case should alert lawyers and law firms to the fact that they
may be held liable for economic injury arising from negligent representation to third parties.

B. Liability of Law Firms to Former Associates
In Wieder v. Skala,3" the Court of Appeals, in an issue of first
impression, reversed the lower courts and held that the plaintiff had

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

See infra notes 297-311 and accompanying text.
80 N.Y.2d 377, 605 N.E.2d 318, 590 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1992).
Prudential Ins., 80 N.Y.2d at 382, 605 N.E.2d at 320, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
See id. at 380, 605 N.E.2d at 319, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
See id.
See id. at 381, 605 N.E.2d at 319-20, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 832-33.
See id. at 381, 605 N.E.2d at 320, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
Prudential Ins., 80 N.Y.2d at 379, 605 N.E.2d at 319, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
80 N.Y.2d 628, 609 N.E.2d 105, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1992).
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stated a claim for relief either for breach of contract or for the tort of
wrongful discharge. Plaintiff alleged he was fired by the defendant
law firm for asking the firm partners to report another associate's misconduct to the Appellate Division Disciplinary Committee as required under DR 1-103(A) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.305 The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that
plaintiff failed to state a cause of action because, as an at-will employee, the firm could terminate him without cause. The Court
stressed that, in any hiring of an attorney as an associate to practice
law with a law firm, there is implied an understanding that both parties will conduct the practice in accordance with the ethical standards
of the profession.306 The Court noted that the plaintiff's failure to
comply with DR 1-103(A) could result in suspension or disbarment.307Thus, the defendant law firm, by insisting that plaintiff disregard the disciplinary rule, placed the plaintiff in the position of having
to choose between continued employment and his own potential suspension and disbarment.308 The Court found this made the relationship of an associate to a law firm employer intrinsically different from
that of employees in the ordinary "at-will" ~ase.~O9
The Court of Appeals also rejected plaintiff's argument that the
decision in Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord310 warranted a recognition of
the tort of abusive discharge.311 The bottom line in Wieder is that law
firms must be careful not to ignore whistleblowing associates.
VIII. MOTIONPRACTICE
AND VENUE
A.

Motion to Reargue

, ~ ~Appellate
~
Division,
In PahI Equipment Corp. v K a s ~ i s the
First Department clarified the standards litigants should follow when
filing motions for leave to renew and to reargue in trial courts. The
appellate division stressed that a motion for leave to reargue pursuant

305. See N.Y. DISCIPLINARY
RULESOF THECODEOF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIDR 1-103(A) (1993).
306. See Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 636, 609 N.E.2d at 108, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
307. See id. at 636-37, 609 N.E.2d at 109, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 638, 609 N.E.2d at 110, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
310. 75 N.Y.2d 95, 550 N.E.2d 410, 551 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1989).
311. See Wieder, 80 N.Y.2d at 638-39, 609 N.E.2d 110, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 757.
312. 182 A.D.2d 22, 588 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1st Dep't 1992).

BILITY
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to CPLR 2221313"is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
and may be granted only upon a showing 'that the court overlooked
or misapprehended the facts or the law or for some reason mistakenly
arrived at its earlier decision.' "314 The appellate division warned advocates not to seek reargument merely to relitigate issues previously
decided or to present arguments different from those originally asserted.315 The appellate division also reminded the bar that a motion
to renew under CPLR 2221 is intended to draw the court's attention
to new or additional facts which, although in existence at the time of
the original motion, were unknown to the party seeking renewal and
therefore not brought to the court's attention.316 Finally, the appellate division pointed out that sanctions could be applied under Part
130 of the Uniform Rules against any litigant who fails to comply
with CPLR 2221 and then imposed sanctions of $3,341.30 on plaintiffs to cover costs and expenses incurred in opposing their motion to
renew and reargue.317

B.

Venue

Two appellate division decisions remind the bench and bar that
some personal injury actions should not be tried in Bronx County.318
In Johnson v. Greater New York Conference of Seventh Day Adventist
Church'319 plaintiffs elected to try their personal injury action in
Bronx
The appellate division ruled that even though the
accident occurred there, venue was improper because neither party
resided in the Bronx.S21 The court also rejected a motion to retain
venue in the Bronx on the grounds that justice would be promoted
because the plaintiffs failed to supply the names, addresses, and occu-

313. See N.Y. CPLR 2221 (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1992).
314. Kassis, 182 A.D.2d at 27, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 11 (citing Schneider v. Solowey, 141
A.D.2d 813, 529 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (2d Dep't 1988)).
3 15. See id.
316. See id. (citing Beiny v. Wynward, 132 A.D.2d 190, 522 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1st
Dep't 1987), appeal dismissed, 71 N.Y.2d 994, 524 N.E.2d 879, 529 N.Y.S.2d 277
(1988)).
317. Id. at 33, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
318. See Johnson v. Greater N.Y. Conference of Seventh Day Adventist Church,
181 A.D.2d 862, 581 N.Y.S.2d 414 (2d Dep't 1992); Delia v. Winter Bros., Inc., 183
A.D.2d 1006, 583 N.Y.S.2d 591 (3d Dep't 1992).
319. Johnson, 181 A.D.2d at 862, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
320. Id. at 863, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
321. Id.
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pations of the witnesses whose convenience would be effected.322
In Delia v. Winter Brothers, Inc. ,323 the plaint* venued a wrongful death action in Bronx County even though the accident occurred
in Rockland County.324 The plaintiff argued that venue was placed in
the Bronx because the defendant purportedly resided there.325 The
supreme court had granted a motion to change venue based on an
affidavit submitted by the defendant which asserted his business address was in the Bronx, but he resided in Rockland County.326

I am grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions from my
colleagues of the bench and bar and in academia. I am particularly
grateful to students in the 1993 graduating classes of Pace University
School of Law and New York Law School for keeping me alert to new
developments in New York Civil Practice. I also wish to express my
sincere appreciation to the editors and members of the Syracuse Law
Review for their patience and assistance.

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Id.
183 A.D.2d 1006, 583 N.Y.S.2d 591 (3d Dep't 1992).
Delia,183 A.D.2d at 1006, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
Id. at 1007, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
Id. at 1006, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
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